Abstract: This paper studies the Verifiable Signature Sharing (VΣS) introduced by Franklin and Reiter, which enables the recipient of a signature to share it among n proxies so that a subset of them can reconstruct it later. By the use of secure distributed key generation based on discrete-log, threshold cryptosystems and verifiable secret sharing scheme, new protocols for RSA VΣS are presented. The protocols are efficient and provable secure and can tolerate the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies.
Introduction
A VΣS protocol, which was introduced by Franklin and Reiter [1] , is divided into sharing phase and recovering phase. At the end of sharing phase, each proxy can verify that a valid signature for the given document can be reconstructed. At the end of recovering phase, such signature is reconstructed no matter what a malicious subset of proxies may do. It could be widely applied in cash escrow, secure distributed auction and distributed cryptosystems etc. For the instance of a secure distributed auction, bidders at an auction may be required to verifiably share : RSA 169 signatures on checks for the amount of their bids. In this way, it will be impossible for the winner of the bid to default (since the proxies can reconstruct his check), while the payments of the loser will never be recovered. Some efficient protocols were given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, Schnorr and DSS signatures respectively. But some of them were broken later. In Ref. [2] , based on the key generation protocol from Feldman's verifiable secret sharing protocol (VSS) and threshold cryptosystems as we will show later, the new protocols for these signatures were presented, which were efficient and provably secure and can tolerate a malicious sharer and the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies during sharing and reconstruction time. But Feldman-VSS assumes that the dealer is never to be corrupted by the attacker. A distributed solution to this problem is the run of n parallel executions of the Feldman-VSS as follows, called Joint-Feldman: For prime p and q with q|p−1, each player P i selects a random secret z i ∈Z q and shares it among the n players using Feldman-VSS. This defines the set QUAL of players that share their secrets properly. The secret key x is set to be the sum of the properly shared secrets and each player can compute his share of x by locally summing up the shares he received. The public key y can be computed as the product of the public values . But Joint-Feldman was insecure (see Ref. [3] ). ) (mod p g y i z i = Our contribution is that we first modify the secure distributed key generation protocol to work over a composite modulus, then construct a threshold cryptosystem and take advantage of the cryptosystem to obtain a new RSA VΣS protocol, which is efficient and provable secure and can tolerate the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies during sharing and reconstruction. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the communication and adversarial models and some primitive tools. In Section 3, we present a new ElGamal-based threshold cryptosystem over a composite modulus. In Section 4, we give a new RSA VΣS scheme.
Preliminaries

The model
We assume there are three entities: the signer (usually called Bob), the recipient (Alice) and a set of n proxies, P 1 ,…,P n . The VΣS protocol will be between Alice and the proxies and must not involve Bob. Each proxy P i has a opened value, say i, to show his identity. We assume that Alice and the proxies are connected by a full network of the private channels and a broadcast channel. All communications are synchronous. Moreover, there exists a static adversary A who can corrupt Alice and at most t of the proxies. Once corrupting one, A can read his memory and cause him to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. The computational power of the adversary is specified by PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) Turing machine.
Tools and cryptographic assumptions
In the following, we assume N>>n to be a composite, product of two large safe primes p and q. We say p and q are safe, if there exist two primes p′ and q′ such that p=2p′+1 and q=2q′+1. We denote with φ(N)=(p−1)(q−1)=4p′q′ the order of multiplicative group of the integers modulo N, relatively prime to N. 
Z
Consider the two probability distributions on ℑ×ℑ×ℑ defined as
for a,b, and c chosen randomly and uniformly in Z N . We assume that the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable. It is obvious that this assumption relies on the hardness of computing discrete-logs.
ElGamal over a composite. We are going to use the following variation of ElGamal encryption scheme [4, 5] over a composite modulus. The public encryption key is EK=(N,G 0 ,G,Y), where N, G 0 and G are as the preceding. 
Verifiable signature sharing
VΣS consists of a pair of protocols (ΣShare,ΣRecover) for Alice and the proxies. The input of ΣShare for all the players is a message m and the public verification key VK of the signer. The secret input for Alice is a signature S of m under the signer's key. The output of ΣShare for each proxy P i is a value S i , which can assume the special value S i =ω denoting that the proxy has rejected the sharing. The protocol ΣRecover is then run on the output of ΣShare by the proxies. Definition 2.1. We say that VΣS=(ΣShare,ΣRecover) is a verifiable signature sharing protocol with fault -tolerance t if, for any adversary A that can corrupt Alice and at most t proxies, the following conditions are met:
•
Completeness:
If Alice is not corrupted, then the output of ΣShare is a signature S on m under the signer's key VK. • Soundness: If a good proxy P i outputs S i =ω at the end of ΣShare, then each good proxy P j outputs S j =ω. If S i ≠ω for good proxies, then the output of ΣRecover is a signature S on m under the signer's key VK.
• Security: Define the view V of the adversary A as the set of messages (including the broadcasted ones) sent and received by the bad players during the ΣShare protocol. Then there exists an algorithm Sim called the simulator which, on input m and VK and with black-box access to A, produces output strings with a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from V.
Remark. We accept a negligible that these conditions are violated. Moreover, completeness means that if Alice really shares the right signature, then, whatever the corrupted proxies do, the signature will be recovered at the end.
Soundness means that if Alice is malicious, then either she will be caught trying to cheat or she will share a valid : RSA 171 signature anyway. Finally, security says that a run of ΣShare gives the adversary no information he could not compute on his own from the message and the public key. In particular, no information about the signature S is revealed unless the scheme is not secure.
Threshold cryptosystem
With the preceding notations, a public key encryption scheme E is defined by three algorithms:
• Key Generation is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and returns a pair (Y,X) where Y is the public encryption key and X is the secret decryption key. Threshold cryptosystems. A threshold cryptosystem T E for E distributes the operation of key generation and decryption among a set of n parties P 1 ,…,P n . That is, T E is defined by three protocols:
• T-Key-Gen: A randomized protocol that returns as public output the public encryption key Y and as private output for player P i a value X i such that X 1 ,…,X n constitute a t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing of X. We say that threshold cryptosystem T E =(T-Key-Gen,T-Decrypt) is secure with fault-tolerance t, if for any adversary A that corrupts at most t players the following conditions must be met:
• correct key generation: T-Key-Gen generates keys with a probability distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from Key Generation. Both T-Key-Gen and Secret-Key-Gen must satisfies the following requirements:
C1. All subsets of t+1 shares from the honest define the same unique secret key X.
C2. All honest players have the same value of public key Y determined by X.
• simulatability: Let V be the view of the adversary A during that protocol, which consists of the set of messages sent and received by the corrupted players during a run of that protocol. Then there exists a simulator Sim with black-box access to A which produces output strings with a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from V.
On the Threshold Cryptosystem
In this section, we present a new ElGamal-based threshold cryptosystem over a composite modulus N, which will be used in our RSA VΣS later, with the techniques appearing in Refs. [1, 6] .
Key generation protocol
We are now ready to show the distributed key generation (DKG) protocol for the later threshold scheme. The general idea follows Gennaro et al. [3] for the case of discrete-log cryptosystem over a composite modulus N. We start by running a commitment stage where each player P i commits to two t-degree polynomials (t is the scheme's threshold) f i (z), which shares a random value z ) (z f i ′ i , i z′ contributed by P i to the jointly generated secret X and X′.
So the following properties from this commitment stage are required: First, the attacker cannot force a commitment by a (corrupted) player P j to depend on the commitment(s) of any set of honest players. Second, for any [7] . At the end of this commitment stage, the secret key X is determined and no later misbehavior can change it. Most importantly, this guarantees that no bias in the output X or Y of the protocol is possible, and it allow us to present a full proof of security based on simulation. Once X is fixed, the players could compute Y=G X (modN).
Pederson-VSS
The protocol Key-Gen appears in below:
Input for all players: A composite N as above. An element , constructed by taking a random element and setting G . For an element H∈〈G〉, assume that it is impossible for the adversary to
Generating X:
1.
Each player P i performs an unconditionally secure VSS of a random number
(a) P i chooses two random polynomials f i (z) and 
2.
Each player then builds the set of non-disqualified players QUAL (In fact, all honest players build the same set QUAL).
3.
The distributed secret value X is not explicitly computed by any player, but it equals . Each 
So the public key is set to be Y.
Secret decryption key generation protocol
We now show the secret decryption key generation protocol in below. The approach is the same as the reconstruction phase of Pederson-VSS. Algorithm 2. Protocol Secret-Decrypt-Key-Gen.
Input for all players:
The public input and output of Key-Gen, {C i |1≤i≤n}, and H. 
1.
Each player P i ∈QUAL broadcasts and proves to each
If the proof fails for an index j, P j broadcasts a complaint against P i .
3.
Each player P j accepts those for which at most t complaints are broadcast. Take t+1 accepted value A i and evaluate interpolation coefficients λ 1i to compute
Theorem 3.1. TEG:=(Key-Gen,Secret-Decrypt-Key-Gen) is a secure key generation protocol for threshold cryptosystem over a composite with fault-tolerance t for any t and n such that n>2t.
Proof: We first prove that the distribution of the public key generated by the protocol is "almost" the same as if it was generated by a centralized user. The distribution of Y is induced by that of X(modφ(N)). In the centralized case, X is chosen in Z N with uniform probability. This results in a distribution statistically close to uniform for Y. So we need to prove that, when X is generated by the protocol, X(modφ(N)) has a distribution which is also statistically close to uniform. Note that
. Since some of the z i 's are under the control of adversary, we can set X=X A + X H (modφ(N)), where X A is chosen by the adversary while X H is determined by the honest. Note that X A can follow any distribution, but it is independent of X H since the adversary decided on it at the end of step 1(c) when she has no information about that of the honest. Thus we can consider X A as a constant. Now it is enough for us to prove that X H is distributed almost uniform over Z φ(N) . W.l.o.g., we assume the first t+1 players are honest, then )) ( (mod 
, which is negligible.
For T-Key-Gen and Secret-Key-Gen, similar to the general t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme (see Ref. [3] and therein references), we know that it satisfies C1 and C2. Now we show simulation of the protocol.
Assume w.l.o.g. that A corrupts players P 1 ,…,P t , B={1,…,t} and ℑ={t+1,…,n}, the indices of the honest. The simulator Sim works as follows.
The simulation of a run of Key-Gen. During the run of Key-Gen, A sees the following probability distribution • Values C ik ,A ik ,i∈ℑ,k=0,…,t corresponding to coefficients of randomly chosen polynomials and for which Eq. (1) Here we must note that all exponents are integer since and L=n!.
Then Sim performs Step 4(a)~Step 4(c). But we must note that the above distribution of values is characterized by the choice of polynomials f i (z), for i∈ℑ\{n} and
as random independent t-degree polynomials over Z N , and of f n (z) as a uniformly chosen polynomial from the family of t-degree polynomials over Z N satisfying
Now we show that the probability distribution output by Sim is identical to the above distribution of A. Note that the above distribution depends on the set QUAL defined at the end of Step 2 of the protocol, since all Sim's actions performing Step 1, Step 2 are identical to the actions of the honest interacting with A in a real run of the protocol, we know that the set QUAL is defined in this simulation step identically to that in the real. Now we describe the output distribution of Sim by modifying some notations as follows:
For i∈ℑ\{n}, set to f 
where d=log G H. By this definition, we can see that all the values of these polynomials evaluated at j∈B coincide with that in Step 1. Also, the coefficients of these polynomials agree with exponentials C ik published by the simulated honest in Step 1 as well as with A ik , i∈ℑ\{n} and published by the simulator on behalf of the honest 
G1
1i , we have . By the same method, Sim can broadcast for i=t+1,…,n and have the similar property. So
it is easy to see that the simulated view is identically distributed to that of the real. This completes the proof.
RSA Verifiable Signature Sharing Scheme
In this section, we will present a RSA VΣS scheme in below, where we take full advantage of the distributed key generation of the preceding protocol. The key is generated distributively by proxies instead of Alice. This will also allow for a very efficient verification that the ciphertext contains the required signature. Indeed, the proxies can verify that the signature is contained in the pair (A S ,B S ) in the following protocol correctly by checking that . If the output is m, they accept; otherwise reject.
RSA-ΣRecover:
The proxies run Secret-Decrypt-Key-Gen on the pair (A S ,B S ) to get . Then Theorem 4.1. Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption modulo a composite, the protocol RSA VΣS is a secure VΣS protocol for RSA with fault-tolerance t for any n, t with n>2t.
Proof: It is easy to see that the correctness of Secret-Decrypt-Key-Gen results in RSA VΣS's correctness and soundness. And Eq. (4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for (A S ,B S ) to decrypt to the signature. So either all the proxies reject if Eq. (4) is not satisfied, or they will all accept when the signature will be decrypted successfully at the end of RSA-ΣRecover.
Now we only need to prove the security of this scheme. W.l.o.g., assume that adversary A corrupts proxies P 1 ,…,P t . The simulator Sim works on input m and (N,v B ), but not the signature S:
1. Sim just sends m, (N,v B ) and a randomly chosen r to the proxies. If we distinguish between the real view and the simulated view, then we could distinguish either of the above two cases. It is easy to see that this contradicts the DDH assumption. This completes the proof.
Conclusions
We present a new, efficient and provably secure VΣS protocol for RSA signature scheme against static active adversary with a negligible probability, which substantially puts forward both theory and practice in this field.
Indeed it could be widely applied in cash escrow, secure distributed auction, and distributed cryptosystems etc., and achieves best-possible robustness at present. Although there are some efficient protocols given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, Schnorr and DSS signatures, their RSA and Rabin VΣS protocols were subsequently broken [2] . Catalano et give a new scheme based on key generation protocol from Feldman's verifiable secret sharing protocol (VSS) and threshold cryptosystems, but as we had shown that Feldman's verifiable secret sharing protocol is not secure. In view of this, our protocol is more secure and as practical as their. Of course, our scheme is complicated and unfavorable to application to some extent, so it may be an interesting problem to find more simple and practical, secure VΣS protocol.
